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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
the heart of the problem. Conceptually, the mere incidence of a tax on the
other government may be a burden on it, and this was the view of the
earlier cases. Realistically, there would seem to be no burden unless the
amount of the tax is unduly onerous.' 0 Through the incidence" on the
federal government of the taxes in question may be clear, their impeding
and retarding effect on it is not as evident because it creates no onerous
financial burden.12 Therefore, the taxes in the instant case and the Western
Lithograph Co. case' 3 are to be invalidated, the decisions must rest on the
basis of their incidence." V.K.
FEDERAL PROCEDuRE-FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-WAIVER OF VENUE BY CON-
sBNT-[United States].-Citizens of New Jersey brought suit in a federal
court in New York to restrain a Delaware corporation there doing business
from carrying out a contract. Service was had upon an agent which the
corporation had appointed according to a New York statute. Defendant
appeared specially and moved to quash service because it was not a resi-
dent of the district. Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States. Held,' judgment reversed. The appointment by a corporation of
an agent as required by the New York statute constituted waiver of the
venue provision of the Judicial Code.2
The history of foreign corporations in federal courts has been marked
by changing attitudes. In 1789, 3 the original Judiciary Act was passed
requiring suit to be brought in the district where defendant was an inhabi-
tant or in which he could be found. In order to permit a corporation to
sue, it was necessary for the Supreme Court in 18094 to decide that citizen-
10. This is the reasoning behind Mr. Justice Holmes's classic statement
in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi (1938) 277 U. S. 218,223, that "The
power to tax is not the power to destroy while this court sits." See also
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Graves v. New York ex
rel. O'Keefe (1939) 306 U. S. 466, 487.
11. "The settlement of the burden on the ultimate taxbearer is spoken
of as the incidence of the tax." Lutz, Public Finance (2d ed. 1929) 317.
12. The lack of an actual financial burden may have been the basis for
the decision in Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe (1939) 306 U. S. 466.
"In no case is there basis for the assumption that any such tangible or
certain economic burden is imposed on the government." 306 U. S. at 486,
487. See also Helvering v. Gerhardt (1938) 304 U. S. 405, 421, "When
immunity is claimed from a tax laid on private persons, it must clearly
appear that the burden upon the state function is actual and substantial,
not conjectural."
13. Western Lithograph Co. v. Board of Equalization (1938) 11 Cal.
(2d) 156, 78 P. (2d) 731, cited supra, note 8.
14. Lack of incidence might have been the controlling consideration in
the Graves case. "That the economic burden of a tax on salaries is passed
on to the employer or that employees will accept a lower governmental
salary because of its tax immunity, are formulas which have not won ac-
ceptance by economists and cannot be judicially assumed." 306 U. S. 466,
484, n. 4.
1. Neibro Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. (1939) 60 S. Ct. 153.
2. Judicial Code (1888) 25 Stat. 433, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 112.
3. (1789) 1 Stat. 78, c. 20, sec. 11.
4. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux (U. S. 1809) 5 Cranch 61.
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ship of the members constituted the test for diversity jurisdiction. The
basis of state legislative control was laid in 1839 when the Court declared
that a corporation can have no legal existence outside the boundaries of the
sovereignty creating it and may by an agent contract in another state only
by the latter's permission.5 Upon the fiction of consent evidenced by doing
business, states enacted statutes designed to secure jurisdiction; FloridaG
passed the first of these statutes and a similar Maryland statute was
upheld by a federal court in 1837.7 Thereafter the Supreme Court accepted
the principle of state jurisdiction over local activities of foreign corpora-
tions.
But with jurisdictional problems arose the related question of venue in
diversity of citizenship suits in the federal courts. In 1877,8 the Supreme
Court in Ex parte Schollenberger, under the Act of 1875, held that state
legislation and the appointment of an agent would authorize the corpora-
tion to be "found" within the district for the purpose of venue as well as
jurisdiction. Then in 1887 and 1888 the present amended Judiciary Act
was enacted,9 eliminating the phrase "or in which he shall be found" and
adding the clause, "only in the district of the residence of either of the
plaintiff or the defendant."
Venue is a personal privilege which may be waived, and the question
was presented as to whether certain acts constituted waiver.10 In 1892
Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co." held that within the meaning of the Act a
corporation was an inhabitant only in the state of organization and could
object to federal venue elsewhere. Then in Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton,12
the Supreme Court passed upon a set of facts arising under a Texas
statute, the validity of which was in question, and stated that even "if
valid" that statute was not sufficient to waive the venue privilege. Due
to the indefiniteness of the opinion as to the ground of that decision, it
occasioned some confusion in later cases; most of the district courts held
that appointment of an agent did not prevent raising of objection to venue.13
The few decisions by the circuit courts of appeal were divided.14
5. Bank of Augusta v. Earle (U. S. 1839) 13 Pet. 519.
6. Florida, Act of Nov. 21, 1829, No. 8.
7. Warren Mfg. Co. v. Etna Ins. Co. (C. C. D. Conn. 1837) 2 Paine 501,
Fed. Cas. No. 17,206.
8. (1877) 96 U. S. 369.
9. Judicial Code (1888) 25 Stat. 433, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 112.
10. Seaboard Rice Milling Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. R. (1925)
270 U. S. 363; Dobie, Venue in Civil Cases in the United States District
Court (1925) 35 Yale L. J. 129; Note (1939) 119 A. L. R. 676. Fletcher,
Cyclopedia Corporations (Perno. ed. 1931) 190, see. 4392.
11. (1891) 145 U. S. 444.
12. (1892) 146 U. S. 202. The Texas statute sought to deny foreign cor-
porations access to the federal courts. It had been held unconstitutional
by the state court also.
13. The following cases cited the Denton case for the insufficiency of the
appointment of an agent to waive the venue privilege: Platt v. Massa-
chusetts Real-Estate Co. (C. C. D. Mass. 1900) 103 Fed. 705; Hagstoz v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1910) 179 Fed. 569; Beech-Nut
Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1921) 287 Fed. 271;
Jones v. Consolidated Wagon & Machine Co. (D. C. D. Idaho 1929) 31 F.
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That question the Neibro case' 5 now answers, at least in part. It does
not affect the principle that a corporation is an inhabitant only of its state
of incorporation nor the rule that venue is a privilege under the Act. For
jurisdictional purposes service must be upon an agent sufficiently represen-
tative to receive service of process.1 6 But if the actual appointment of an
agent, although under direction of a state statute, may be said to consti-
tute a "real consent"1 7 in relation to jurisdiction, so the majority of the
Court held that that appointment may operate as consent in advance to
waive the venue provision also. In reaching this result the majority inter-
preted as dictum that portion of the Denton case which said that compli-
ance with the statute was not consent to waive the venue privilege.' 8 The
majority also distinguished In re Keasby & Mattison Co.,19 cited by the
dissent, upon the ground that there the designation of an agent as required
by the state statute "which is the basis of consent had in fact not been
made."
Several types of statutes have been enacted by the states. 20 One allows
the corporation to appoint its own agent, filing his name with a state
official. 21 Another designates a particular state official. 22 The appointment
(2d) 383; Thomas Kerfoot & Co. v. United Drug Co. (D. C. Del. 1930)
38 F. (2d) 671; Standard Stoker v. Lower (D. C. Md. 1931) 46 F. (2d)
678; Gray v. Reliance Life Ins. Co. (D. C. W. D. La. 1938) 24 F. Supp.
144; Hamilton Watch Co. v. George W. Borg Co. (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1939)
27 F. Supp. 215; Toulmin v. James Mfg. Co. (D. C. W. D. N. Y. 1939)
27 F. Supp. 512. Contra: Riddle v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. (C. C. W. D.
Pa. 1889) 39 Fed. 290; Consolidated Store-Service Co. v. Lamson Consoli-
dated Store-Service Co. (C. C. Mass. 1890) 41 Fed. 833; Patten v. Dodge
Mfg. Co. (D. C. Ind. 1928) 23 F. (2d) 852, approved (C. C. A. 7, 1932)
60 F. (2d) 676.
14. Insufficient to waive the venue privilege, McLean v. Mississippi (C.
C. A. 5, 1938) 96 F. (2d) 741; Neibro Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.
(C. C. A. 2, 1939) 103 F. (2d) 765 (overruled by present case). Dodge
Mfg. Co. v. Patten (C. C. A. 7, 1932) 60 F. (2d) 676, aff'g (D. C. Ind.
1928) 23 F. (2d) 852; Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric
Co. (C. C. A. 10, 1938) 100 F. (2d) 770. Is it significant that all these
Circuit Court of Appeals decisions were rendered after 1928?
15. Neibro Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. (1939) 60 S. Ct. 153.
16. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley (1898) 172 U. S. 602.
17. Bagdon v. Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Co. (1916) 217
N. Y. 432, 436, 437, 111 N. E. 1075.
18. Neibro Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. (1939) 60 S. Ct. 153.
19. (1895) 160 U. S. 221.
20. Nearly every state in the Union has passed some statute requiring
a foreign corporation engaging in business within the state to appoint a
statutory service agent upon whom process against the corporation may
be served. But these vary as to provisions. See: Note (1933) 11 Tex. L.
Rev. 226, for discussion of statutes and statutory citations.
21. Secretary of State shall require "a designation of a person upon
whom process against the corporation may be served within the state."
N. Y. Birdseye Cumming & Gilbert's Consol. Laws (1909) c. 28, sec. 16.
22. Under the amended statute in New York, the Secretary of State is
the agent to be designated "upon whom all process in any action or pro-
ceedings against it may be served within the state." New York Thompson's
Laws (1939) c. 28, see. 210.
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of the agent in the Neibro case was made under the old New York statute
of the first type above. What effect will the Neibro case have when statutes
of the latter type, as the present New York statute, come before the Court?
Will the Court hold that designation of an official is sufficient consent to
produce the "state of facts" necessary to give jurisdiction over an absent
corporation? Or is this case the beginning of a recession from the hereto-
fore consistent policy of limiting federal jurisdiction? 23
W. K.
LABOR-STATE ANTI-INJUNCTION LAWs-LABOR DISPUTE-PIKETING BY
OUTSIDE UNION-[Illinois.-Plaintiffs were the owner and all the em-
ployees of a beauty shop which the defendant union was picketing in an
effort to unionize. There was no dispute between the employer and the
employees; unionizing efforts on the premises, with which the employer did
not interfere, failed completely. The picketing was accompanied by some
minor acts of violence. Held, all picketing enjoined since no labor dispute
existed under the Illinois Anti-Injunction Act, the disputants not standing
in the relation of employer and employee.'
At the present time twenty-seven states, including Illinois, have Anti-
Injunction Acts applicable to labor disputes.2 In all cases arising under
such acts, the determination of the existence of a labor dispute presents a
difficult problem. Prior to 1939 fifteen states3 had a definition of labor
23. E. g., amendments of the Judiciary Act have increased the juris-
dictional amount from five hundred dollars to three thousand dollars, and
the amendment of 1887-1888 curtailed jurisdiction by restricting the venue
provision.
1. Swing v. A. F. of L. (1939) 372 Ill. 91, 22 N. E. (2d) 857.
2. Ariz. Rev. Code (1928) c. 92, sec. 4286; Cal. Labor Code (1937) sec.
921; Colo. Stats. Ann. (1935) c. 97, secs. 78; Conn. Gen. Stats. (1939
Supp.) sec. 1420 (e) ; Idaho Laws of 1939, c. 215; Ill. Rev. Stats. (1937) c.
48, sec. 2 (a); Ind. Burn's Stats. (1933) tit. 40, c. 5, see. 504; Kan. Gen.
Stats. (1935) c. 60, sec. 1104; La. Gen. Stats. (1939) c. 13, sec. 4379.5; Me.
Laws of 1933, c. 261, sec. 1; Md. Code (1935 Supp.) art. 100, sec. 67;
Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 149, sec. 24, as amended by Acts of 1935, c. 407
as added by Acts of 1938, c. 345, sec. 2; Minn. Mason's Stats. (1927) sec.
4256, as amended by Minn. Mason's Stats. (1938 Supp.) sec. 4256, as
amended by Laws of 1939, c. 440, sec. 11; Mont. Rev. Code (1935) sec.
9242; N. H. Pub. Laws (1926) c. 380, sec. 27, as amended by Laws of 1935,
c. 46; N. J. Rev. Stats. (1937) tit. 2, c. 29, see. 77; N. M. Laws of 1939,
c. 195, sec. 1; N. Y. Thompson's Laws (1939) Civ. Prac. Act, sec. 876a;
N. D. Laws of 1935, c. 247; Okla. Stats. (1931) c. 52, art. 4, sec. 10878;
Ore. Code (1935 Supp.) tit. 49, sec. 1901; Pa. Laws of 1937, act. no. 308, as
amended by Laws of 1939, act. no. 163; R. I. Laws of 1936, c. 2359, sec. 1;
Utah Rev. Stats. (1939 Supp.) c. 49, sec. 2A; Wash. Rem. Rev. Stats.(1937) sec. 7612; Wis. Code (1937) sec. 103.53, as amended by Laws of
1939, c. 25; Wyo. Rev. Stats. (1934 Supp.) c. 63, sec. 201, as amended by
Laws of 1937, c. 15. Missouri has no Anti-Injunction Act.
3. Colo., Conn., Idaho, Ind., La., Md., Mass., Minn., N. Y., N. D., Ore.,
Pa., Utah, Wash., Wis. Massachusetts omits clause, "whether or not dis-
putants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."
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